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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. 
KENNETH H. RISLOW, : Case No. 860332 
Defendants/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the district court's affirmance 
of a conviction for the offense of Lewdness, a class B misdemea-
nor, in violation of §13-9-702 of the West Valley Revised 
Ordinances, in the Fifth Circuit Court, West Valley Circuit, 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Judge presid-
ing. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged by Information with the offense 
of Lewdness, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of §13-9-702 
of the West Valley Revised Ordinances. The case was tried 
before a four member jury on December 18th, 1985. On that same 
date, appellant was convicted, as charged, by the jury. On 
January 30, 1986, appellant was sentenced by the circuit court. 
On February 7th, 1986, appellant filed a notice of appeal to 
the District Court. After both sides submitted oral and written 
argument to Judge Judith M. Billings, of the third judicial 
district court, said court affirmed the circuit court judgment 
in a memorandum decision dated April 28th, 1986. After hearing 
further argumentf the district court, on May 29th, 1986, issued 
a second memorandum decision affirming the April 28th, 1986, 
opinion. On June 6th, 1986, appellant filed a notice of appeal 
with this court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this court reversing 
the judgment and conviction rendered against him, and remanding 
this case to the fifth circuit court for a new trial. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether appellant 
was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel where trial counsel made no attempt to object to the 
prosecutor's clearly unreasonable and objectionable argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At trial, the City's first witness was Katherine 
Loveless, who testified that on May 4, 1985, she was employed 
as a secretary at ZCMI, which is located in the Valley Fair 
Mall. (Transcript, pages 35-36) She stated that she first 
noticed appellant in the early afternoon on that day as he was 
walking up the stairs near her desk. (Tr. 36) 
At that time, Loveless noticed that appellant had on 
a T-shirt, jogging shorts, and a large utility belt around his 
waist. (Tr. 36) Also, she noticed that his shorts were "hiked 
up on one side", thus exposing a substantial part of his penis 
and testicles. (Tr. 36) After he walked past her desk, 
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appellant then stood in a credit line for a few minutes. (Tr. 
37) Then, according to Loveless, he walked over to the toy 
department, but later came back to her area and picked up a bus 
schedule. (Tr. 37) 
Loveless indicated that, after appellant came back 
the second time, she went to get a store security guard. (Tr. 
40) However, by the time she returned, he had gone into the 
restroom. (Tr. 40) She indicated that when appellant emerged 
from the restroom, the shorts seemed to be pulled up even higher 
than before. (Tr. 41) The security guard then contacted a 
West Valley City police officer, who was in the store investi-
gating a shoplifting incident. (Tr. 42) 
Finally, Loveless testified that a number of people 
in the store observed appellant (Tr. 42), but that no one made 
an attempt to tell him that he had a problem. (Tr. 43) 
The City also called, among others, Scott Longson, 
who was employed as the store security guard on May 4th. (Tr. 
66) He indicated that it appeared to him the belt had caused 
the pants to be "kind of hiked up". (Tr. 67) However, Longson 
indicated that he did not mention this problem to appellant. 
(Tr. 70) 
After the City rested, appellant then took the stand 
in his own behalf. (Tr. 84) He testified that he had gone to 
ZCMI that day to pay a bill. (Tr. 86) Appellant further 
testified he was not aware of the fact that he was "hanging 
out", when he was approached by the police officer. (Tr. 91) 
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After appellant testified, his trial counsel called three 
character witnesses who attested to his reputation for truthful-
ness and veracity, as well as his good character. Testimony 
was also introduced through opinion evidence relating to truth-
fulness and good character. (Tr. 98-117) 
In response to appellant's character witnesses, the 
prosecutor called his ex-wife, Pamela Richards, to attest to 
his lack of veracity and truthfulness, as well as his bad 
character. (Tr. 119) However, in addition to eliciting testi-
mony from her with regard to reputation and character, he also 
asked her several questions, over defense counsel's objections, 
regarding specific instances of bad conduct and/or other bad 
acts. (Tr. 120) 
Specifically, he asked her if appellant had ever 
"fibbed" to her (Tr. 120)1, if he had failed to pay his income 
taxes (Tr. 121-122), if he had fraudulently registered a motor 
vehicle (Tr. 122); and was able to elicit a statement from her 
that people they had known were afraid of appellant. (Tr. 123) 
It should be noted that the prosecutor did not, at any point, 
confront appellant or his character witnesses with any of these 
extrinsic facts on cross-examination. 
Finally, in closing argument, the city prosecutor 
1. At this point, trial counsel voiced his objection to any 
reference to specific instances of conduct as provided by 
Sections 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
objection was overruled by the Court. 
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made the following statement, which was not objected to by 
trial counsel: 
Counsel finally says that he's [appellant] 
guilty of being a slop (sic), not lewdness. 
I'm sorry. It's more than that. It's much 
more than that. Do you want people walking 
into the stores where you shop, dressed in 
that fashion, dangling their genitalia and 
you're going to find them not guilty? See, 
that presumption of innocence just went out 
the window. It's now time for you to decide 
this case. If you want these people walking 
around in your stores where you shop, then 
you're going to find him not guilty. If 
you want to put a stop to it, you're going 
to find him guilty. You raised your hand, 
an obligation, you swore that you would 
well and truly try this case. I'm askinq 
you now to do what you agreed to do. (Tr. 
173) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue here concerns trial counsel's failure to 
object to the prosecutor's closing argument, which, appellant 
submits, was clearly improper. More important was the fact 
that trial counsel failed to object to this inflammatory 
statement. This is especially true where the prosecutor had 
already been able to introduce other instances of "bad character" 
on appellant's part. 
Based on these factors, appellant believes that his 
trial counsel was ineffective. Thus, appellant was denied his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel pursuant 
to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. 
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ARGUMENT 
In State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 (1986)f 
court reversed a conviction for third degree felony 
because of the prosecutor's improper closing argument, 
Andreasony the prosecutor had argued: 
Now, if these two gentlemen were our only 
concern, we could probably let them go but 
they're not. Ladies and gentlemen, we have 
a concern for all of society, we have 
concerns if this goes on and that this is 
not an isolated incident. This type of 
conduct is pervasive and when we're — 
Mr. Mower: I object. I think the prosecutor 
is trying to paint the picture that there 
are others who are not charaed and who are 
not before the Court. 
The Court: Objection's overruled. This is 
argument, Counsel. 
Mr. Brown: Perhaps the Defense would have 
you believe that nobody else is doing it 
but they are and every time we have a jury 
trial, people are watching. People are 
watching to see how we administer justice 
and so, before you determine that there is 
some reasonable doubt — and I'm not sure 
what it is — but before you determine 
that, you need to consider that we're not — 
we've heard a lot about these two Defendants 
but they are not the only ones here and 
they are not the only ones we need to be 
concerned about. We've got to be concerned 
about the law. 
Now, we give the Defendants a lot of 
rights to insure that we never convict an 
innocent man but while we're insuring that, 
we need to be concerned about how many who 
aren't innocent are turned loose and how it 
affects them and us but also how it affects 
others, others who are going to base their 
decisions on conduct and what they know 
about how our system works. 
So it is a weighty decision but you 
need to consider everyone who is involved 
here. 
6 
The court began it's analysis by stating that a two-
part test was to be employed in reviewing alleged prejudicial 
remarks made by a prosecutor during closing argument. The 
first part of the test considers whether the remarks called the 
attention of jurors to matters they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict. 1^ 3. at 402. The 
second part of the test considers, given a violation of part 
one, whether the appellant demonstrated, under the facts of 
each particular case, that the jurors were probably influenced 
by the improper remarks in reaching their verdict. I_d. at 
402-03. 
The court then held that part one of the test had 
been met. It stated that: 
The jury's attention was clearly called to 
matters outside the evidence of the case, 
e.g., that defendant's alleged conduct was 
"pervasive", that others were involved in 
similar conduct, and that the jury needed 
to be concerned about those "who aren't 
innocent but are turned loose". Ld. at 
402. 
As to the second part, the court ruled that because 
of circumstantial and sufficiently conflicting evidence in the 
case, the jury was probably influenced by the comments. Id^. at 
403. Thus, the case was reversed and remanded to new trial. 
Appellant submits that application of the Andreason 
analysis in the instant case would require a reversal if that 
issue itself could have been brought before this court on 
appeal. Clearly, the statements here were as offensive as 
those in Andreason, in that it called the jury's attention to 
7 
others apparently committing the same acts as appellant had 
done. Further, it appealed to the jury to convict appellant so 
as to prevent "these people [from] walkinq around in your stores 
where you shop"• 
As to the second part of the test, the evidence in 
the instant case was also circumstantial and sufficiently in 
conflict. The testimony indicated that although appellant was 
exposed, no one communicated that fact to him in order to 
ascertain his intent and/or lack of knowledge. Also, appellant 
himself testififed that he was not aware he was exposed at the 
time. Appellant submits that because of the marginal nature of 
criminal intent and/or knowledge, there existed a reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of the improper argument, there 
might have been a different result. See, State v. Andreason, 
supra at 403; State v. Tucker, Utah, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (1985); 
State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146 (1981). 
Because this case involves an appeal from a conviction 
which originated in circuit court, appeal to this court on the 
basis of improper prosecutorial comment is not proper because 
this court has not traditionally treated this issue as one 
involving a constitutional question. However, appellant be-
lieves that the constitutional issue here involves his trial 
counsel's failure to object to conduct which orobably could 
have or should have resulted in a mistrial in the instant case. 
Therefore, this brief will focus on those cases that deal with 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant 
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urges this court, in its analysis to consider the prosecutor's 
statements, in conjunction with other "bad acts" evidence 
improperly introduced at trial, as contributors to the prejudi-
cial effect that failure to object under the particular circum-
stances of this case may have had. 
In Strickland v. Washington, U.S. , 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1984) the United States Supreme 
Court announced that the following test would be applicable 
with regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
[T]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. 
This court has recently established its own three-
prong test to be applied in determining whether a conviction 
should be set aside or reversed based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel: 
1) The burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendant "and 
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter". State v. 
McNichol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976). 
2) A lawyers "legitimate exercise of 
judgment in the choice of trial strategy or 
tactics that did not produce the anticipated 
result does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel". McNichol, supra at 
205. 
3) It must appear that any deficiency in 
the performance of counsel was prejudicial. 
In this context, prejudice means that 
without counsel's error there was a 
"reasonable likelihood that there would 
have been a different result." 
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Appellant submits that both the federal and state 
tests are similar in practical effect. In addition, appellant 
submits that his counsel was ineffective under either standard. 
Because the state standard is both more substantial and more 
specific than the federal standard, analysis will be made 
pursuant thereto. 
Under the first prong of the Codianna test, appellant 
submits that he has met his burden of proof in showing that the 
error here is demonstrable and not speculative. Here, the 
trial transcript, on its face, clearly points out the objection-
able facts, in addition to his counsel's failure to object 
thereto. 
Pursuant to the second prong, it is equally clear 
that defense counsel's failure to object did not involve 
legitimate exercise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy. 
Certainly, the failure to object to this type of argument at a 
point in the trial when defense counsel has completed his case, 
cannot possibly be construed to be a strategic-type decision. 
The district court, in its analysis of these two 
prongs, held that because trial counsel had already objected so 
many times at trial, he may have reasonably determined that 
further objection would cause the jury to react adversely. 
With all due respect to the district court, appellant submits 
that there comes a point where trial strategy must give way to 
a clear responsibility to object to something which is so clearly 
"out-of-bounds". In the instant case, this is so. The danger 
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here is not in possibly alienating the jury. Rather, it is the 
suggestion to the jurors that they may consider prejudicial 
matters outside the scope of the evidence that is so critical. 
In not objecting, defense counsel permitted the jury to deal 
with inflammatory social and/or moral issues which would be 
damaging to any defendant. Failure to object to such statements 
simply goes bevond mere trial strategy analysis. 
As to the third prong, the likelihood of a different 
result without the statements is certainly reasonable. Again, 
in its memorandum decision, the district court stated that the 
likelihood of prejudice to appellant was weak "in view of the 
substantial competent evidence in the record supporting the 
appellant's conviction". (Memorandum decision, page 15) 
Appellant submits that the significant conflict in 
the evidence, combined with the circumstantial nature of the 
city's case, seriously undermines the district court's assertion 
that the evidence was substantial. Appellant believes the 
evidence was close enough that any improper conduct during 
closing argument could have been enough to impact on the jury's 
decision. 
In State v. Buel, Utah, 700 P.2d 701 (1985), the 
appellant had been convicted of aggravated assault and possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. Among other 
issues raised, appellant argued that his trial counsel had been 
ineffective because he failed to object to the admission of a 
document which was used to prove that he had been convicted of 
a prior felony in Washington. In holding that appellant had 
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failed to satisfy Codianna, the court stated that counsel's 
failure to object to the chain of custody was not improper and 
would have been futile anyway. The court then quoted an earlier 
case, stating that "effective representation does not require 
counsel to object when doing so would be futile". 16^. at 703, 
quoting State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (1982). 
Appellant submits that the instant case can be 
distinguished from Buel. In Buel, it was clear that the 
objection would have had no effect since it would not have 
been meritorious. On the other hand, an objection in the instant 
case would have, at the very least, resulted in a curative 
instruction from the court. Further, it could have resulted in 
a mistrial based on Andreason, supra. Certainly, the objection 
would not have been futile or without merit. 
In State v. White, Utah, 671 P.2d 191 (1983), trial 
counsel failed to subpoena a witness who she believed would 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. This witness had initially 
confessed to the crime which her client was charged with. In 
holding that appellant had failed to prove his counsel had been 
ineffective, this court stated: 
...the appellant does not establish that 
there is any reasonable likelihood that the 
jury would have reached a different result 
if [the witness] had been subpoenaed and 
testified. We have no way of knowing what 
[his] testimony would have been. He might 
have asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege 
or he miqht have testified and denied ever 
confessing ... Id_. at 194-195. 
Appellant agrees with the court's reasoning in White. 
There, the questioned tactics were such that one could only 
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speculate as to why trial counsel chose not to utilize an 
obviously questionable confession. In the instant case, however, 
none of the speculation that existed in White is present. 
Rather, the questioned lack of action by trial counsel relates 
to a statement actually made by the prosecutor in the jury's 
presence. Further, this statement was made after the evidence 
introduced at trial had already included negative character 
evidence which the district court even believed was erroneously 
admitted. (District Court memorandum decision, paqe 7) This 
case simply presents that rare situation where, under its unique 
facts, the probability of prejudice arisinq from a statement as 
was made was likely. Counsel's failure to object at that parti-
cular time cannot be attributed to mere strategy. It was 
ineffective under any standard and appellant is therefore 
entitled to a new trial. 
Finally, this court, in State v. Frame, Utah, 723 
P.2d 401 (1986) has defined "reasonable probability" "as that 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict". at 405, quoting State v. Lairby, Utah, 699 P.2d 1187 
at 1204-06 (1984). This prong, appellant submits is the crux 
of this case. Because it appears clear that trial counsel 
should have, under the facts of this case, objected to the 
improper remarks, the guest ion then concerns the "reasonable 
probability" that the statements and the lack of objection were 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict. 
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Again, the prosecutor was able to improperly introduce 
evidence that appellant had lied to his ex-wife, failed to pay 
income taxes, fraudulently registered a motor vehicle and was 
violent. Although these improprieties are not before this 
court on appeal, one must look at these facts in conjunction 
with the statement to see that confidence in the verdicts 
reliability must necessarily be greatly undermined. The danger 
of the jury looking at appellant as a bad person in light of 
the character evidence and the prosecutor1s plea to the jury to 
make a moral judgment rather than one based only on the facts 
of this case was obvious. This danger was not speculative, 
like in White, it was real. Therefore, appellant is entitled 
to a new trial• 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument, which demonstrates that 
trial counsel was ineffective, appellant's conviction should be 
vacated and reversed with an order to the circuit court for a 
new trial. 
Dated this day of November, 1986. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
EARL XAIZ 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Spence Robinson, Assistant 
West Valley City Prosecutor, 2470 South Redwood Road, West Valley 
City, Utah, 84119, on this day of October, 1986. 
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